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I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
juveniles are less culpable than adults and therefore “less
deserving of the most severe punishments.”1 For example, in
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Washington and Lee School of Law, 2018;
Bachelor of Arts, Magna Cum Laude, Criminal Justice, Seton Hall University,
2014.
1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 68 (2010) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.
Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (“[W]e require [a sentencer] to take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”).
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Graham v. Florida,2 the Supreme Court ruled that sentencing a
juvenile to life without parole (LWOP) for non-homicide offenses
violates the Eighth Amendment.3 Additionally, in Miller v.
Alabama,4 the Supreme Court found mandatory LWOP sentences
for juveniles, in homicide cases, unconstitutional.5
Unfortunately, the Graham and Miller decisions have caused
much confusion about how to incorporate these rules into juvenile
sentencing.6 In Graham, the Court found that juveniles who
commit non-homicide offenses must be afforded a “meaningful
opportunity for release” but allowed states to define meaningful
opportunity, which has led to many different outcomes.7 Indeed,
the dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia
predicted that failing to define “meaningful opportunity” would “no
doubt embroil the courts for years.”8 For example, state courts have
grappled with the issue of whether lengthy term-of-years
sentences may violate Graham and Miller because they de facto
sentence them to LWOP.9 Courts have also grappled with the
question of whether the prospect for geriatric parole constitutes a
meaningful opportunity for release.10
2. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that life
imprisonment without parole for non-homicide crimes committed by juveniles
violates the Eighth Amendment).
3. See id. at 74 (explaining that juveniles are not as culpable as adults and
therefore should not be punished as severely).
4. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that life
imprisonment without parole for homicide crimes committed by juveniles violates
the Eighth Amendment).
5. See id. at 465 (explaining how juveniles should be afforded the
opportunity to be rehabilitated and return to society).
6. See Kelly Scavone, How Long is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses
to De Facto Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v.
Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3439, 3441–42 (2015) (stating how the rules in
Graham and Miller are unclear and giving an example of lengthy term of years
sentences to show how difficult the application of those cases has been).
7. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; see also Scavone, supra note 6, at 3442
(“Responses in state courts to the issue of virtual LWOP sentences after Miller
and Graham have varied significantly.”).
8. Graham, 560 U.S. at 123.
9. See Scavone, supra note 6, at 3441–42 (explaining that lengthy term of
years sentences are virtually LWOP sentences due to how young the offenders
are).
10. See LeBlanc v. Mathena, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86090, at *31–32 (E.D.
Va. July 1, 2015) (explaining how geriatric release was determined to be
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This Note aims to assess whether geriatric parole should
constitute a meaningful opportunity for release under Graham.
The first section will discuss why juveniles are treated differently
in the first place. Then, the rule set out in Graham will be further
analyzed. Third, the issue of lengthy term-of-years sentences will
be briefly discussed to exemplify issues the courts have had with
the Graham rule. Then geriatric parole and parole will be defined
and compared. Finally, this Note will analyze how courts have
dealt with geriatric parole so far—with a heavy focus on Virginia
courts. The Note will conclude with whether geriatric parole
should constitute a meaningful opportunity for release.
II. Why Juveniles Are Treated Differently
Graham v. Florida, Roper v. Simmons11 and Miller v. Alabama
have shaped the framework for treating juveniles differently in our
criminal justice system. In Roper, the Court considered whether it
is permissible under the Eighth Amendment to execute a juvenile
for committing a capital offense.12 At age seventeen, Christopher
Simmons discussed murdering someone with his two friends.13
Simmons assured “[them] they could ‘get away with it’ because
they were minors.”14 Simmons and one other friend proceeded to
break into the victim’s—Mrs. Cook’s—house, and bind her arms
and legs and wrap her face in duct tape.15 Simmons and his friend
took Mrs. Cook to a railroad trestle and threw her over into the
waters below, leaving her to drown.16 Simmons confessed to his
crimes, and was convicted and sentenced to death.17 Even with
compliant with Graham but ultimately disagreed with the Virginia Supreme
Court); but see State v. Zuber, 126 A.3d 335, 346–47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2015) (stating that a defendant’s opportunity for geriatric release would satisfy
Graham and Miller).
11. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that capital
punishment for crimes committed by juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment).
12. See id. at 555–56 (discussing juveniles’ culpability for the crimes they
committed).
13. Id. at 556.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 556–57.
17. Id. at 557.
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these egregious facts, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the decision, holding that capital punishment of a
juvenile is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment due to
the mitigating factor of youth.18
Miller v. Alabama involved two juveniles, both age fourteen,
who committed separate crimes but were both sentenced to
mandatory terms of LWOP for homicide offenses.19 Kuntrell
Jackson and two other boys robbed a video store in Arkansas.20
Initially, Jackson stayed outside as the robbery was taking place
but later entered the store to see what was happening.21 It was not
clear whether Jackson then stated, “[w]e ain’t playin,’” or instead
told his friends, “I thought you all was playin.’”22 Nevertheless, one
of the other boys shot and killed the clerk.23 Jackson was charged
with capital murder and aggravated robbery.24
Evan Miller was sentenced to LWOP for a homicide offense.25
Miller and a friend attempted to steal his neighbor’s—Mr.
Cannon’s—wallet after smoking marijuana with him.26 Cannon
was passed out at the time, but he woke up and grabbed Miller’s
throat.27 Miller’s friend struck Cannon with a nearby baseball bat
and Cannon then released Miller.28 After that, Miller took the bat
and repeatedly struck Cannon.29 He then placed a sheet over
Cannon’s head and stated, “I am God, I’ve come to take your life,”
and delivered one final blow.30 Later, the boys returned to the
trailer to burn it to get rid of the evidence.31 Cannon died from

18. See id. at 575 (holding capital punishment cannot be imposed upon
juveniles).
19. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 466.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 467.
26. Id. at 468.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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smoke inhalation.32 The Supreme Court remanded the case,
reversing the lower courts’ sentences of LWOP because it found
youth too compelling a factor to allow a mandatory sentence of
LWOP.33
The Supreme Court has stated three reasons why juveniles
should be treated differently than adults in criminal justice
cases.34 First, juveniles lack maturity and have an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility when compared to adults.35 This often
results in reckless decision-making.36 Second, “juveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible [than adults] to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure.”37 Finally, “the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.
The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less
fixed.”38 Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined that
juveniles are less culpable for their crimes than adults and may
not be a danger to society forever.39 As a result, a mandatory
sentence of LWOP for a juvenile who committed homicide is
unconstitutional.40 Additionally, a juvenile cannot be sentenced to
LWOP for a non-homicide offense.41

32. Id.
33. Id. at 465.
34. See cases cited supra note 1 (delineating the major reasons to take into
consideration when sentencing a juvenile).
35. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (explaining how it is rare when
“a juvenile offender has sufficient psychological maturity, and at the same time
demonstrates sufficient depravity, to merit a sentence of death”).
36. See id. at 569 (discussing why a juvenile may commit such a heinous
crime).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 570.
39. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2012) (explaining
incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth and thus it cannot be assumed a juvenile
is forever dangerous).
40. Id.
41. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (“This clear line is
necessary to prevent the possibility that [LWOP] sentences will be imposed on
juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are sufficiently culpable to merit that
punishment.”).
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III. Graham’s Meaningful Opportunity for Release

Terrance Graham pled guilty to armed burglary with assault
or battery and attempted armed robbery when he was sixteen
years old.42 He was later released on parole.43 Terrence violated his
parole when he was involved in a violent home robbery and fled
from the police.44 Consequently, the trial court sentenced Terrance
to life without parole for armed burglary.45 The Supreme Court
reversed the decision, finding it unconstitutional.46
After reviewing the mitigating youth factors, the Supreme
Court held that a juvenile who commits a non-homicide offense
must have some meaningful opportunity for release based on
maturity and demonstrated rehabilitation.47 The Court also
specified that a “[s]tate is not required to guarantee eventual
freedom to such an offender.”48
The Graham Court did state some examples of what will not
qualify as a meaningful opportunity.49 For example, any “criminal
procedure laws that fail to take defendant’s youthfulness into
account at all would be flawed.”50 Furthermore, if there is nothing
in the state’s law that “prevents its courts from sentencing a
juvenile nonhomicide offender to life without parole” it is
inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment.51 The Court did not
explain definitively what would constitute a meaningful
opportunity.52
42. Id. at 53–54.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 55.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 81–82 (explaining that due to the juvenile’s culpability he may
be able to be rehabilitated and return to society).
47. Id. at 50; see also LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12cv340, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 86090, at *29–30 (E.D. Va. July 1, 2015) (citing Angel v. Commonwealth,
704 S.E.2d 386, 401 (Va. 2011)) (“The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that an
inmate’s opportunity to apply for geriatric release renders a sentence of life
without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders compliant with Graham.”).
48. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010).
49. See id. at 76 (discussing certain situations that will not suffice to meet a
meaningful opportunity).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 75 (deciding state courts may define what constitutes a
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Two years after Graham was decided, in Miller v. Alabama,
the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify what meaningful
opportunity means.53 In Miller, as noted above, the Court extended
the youth factors to juvenile offenders who committed homicide
and invalidated laws that mandated LWOP.54 Unfortunately, the
Court did not clarify what meaningful opportunity means and
continued to allow states to decide the matter.55 In fact, the
Supreme Court merely mentioned meaningful opportunity for
release in one line of the opinion to help support its decision.56
Many states have responded differently to Graham.57 The
large disparity among the states indicates how broad and
confusing the definition of meaningful opportunity is.58 For
example, Michigan provides for release after a minimum of ten
years served, Colorado requires a minimum of forty years served
and Virginia has used geriatric parole to satisfy a meaningful
opportunity.59 Other states, such as California, have statutes that
permit any inmate, sentenced to LWOP, to seek resentencing after

meaningful opportunity for release).
53. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (holding that “the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”).
54. See id. at 473 (considering youth “in determining the appropriateness of
a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole”).
55. See id. at 479 (holding that meaningful opportunity precludes a life in
prison but providing little guidance beyond that).
56. See id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010)) (referencing the
meaningful opportunity language from Graham, but ultimately using factors of
youth to make the ultimate decision).
57. See, e.g., H.B. 5512, 94th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Mich. 2006) (detailing
Michigan’s law for dealing with the Graham decision); see also, e.g., H.B. 06-1315,
65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (stating Colorado’s law for dealing with
Graham).
58. See Rebecca Lowry, The Constitutionality of Lengthy Term-Of-Years
Sentences for Juvenile Non-Homicide Offenders, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 881, 912–
13 (2014) (giving examples of the variety of different outcomes on how to deal with
Graham).
59. See H.B. 5512 (detailing the disparity in application of the Graham rule);
H.B. 06-1315.
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serving a minimum of fifteen years.60 Many other states have
responded as well but few are exactly alike.61
Legislatures are not the only ones Graham has left puzzled.
State courts have also had difficulties deciding how to interpret a
meaningful opportunity.62 One common point of contention
between courts is whether Graham requires juveniles to have the
opportunity for a “‘meaningful life outside of prison’ in which to
‘engage meaningfully’ in a career or raising a family,”63 or if it
merely requires a “meaningful and realistic ‘opportunity to obtain
release.’”64 On the one hand, Graham would demand a much
stricter analysis of sentencing if life after prison is what must be
meaningful.65 On the other hand, some interpret Graham as
merely requiring a meaningful chance of release regardless of what
life may be like after prison.66 Under a literal translation, it would
appear the latter is correct because the Court merely states that
there must be a meaningful opportunity for release.67 But some

60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(2)(A)(1) (2015) (“[D]efendant was sentenced to
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for
at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for
recall and resentencing.”).
61. A State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS (July 31, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/amp/US/wireStory/state-statejuvenile-life-parole-48942316 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
62. See State v. Zuber, 126 A.3d 335, 346–47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015)
(indicating courts that have struggled with defining meaningful opportunity and
what it needs to entail).
63. Id. at 347 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75, 79 (2010)); see also
Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1047–48 (Conn. 2015) (stating
Graham requires a meaningful opportunity for life outside of prison).
64. Id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)); see also
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016) (explaining meaningful
does not involve quality of life outside of prison but rather that they are afforded
some opportunity of life outside of prison).
65. See id. (citing cases that show courts struggling to decide what an
opportunity for a reasonable life outside of prison would constitute).
66. See id. (describing when courts have struggled to decide whether there
was a meaningful opportunity for release even if that opportunity came at a time
in the prisoner’s life that he would not lead a meaningful life outside of prison).
67. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (concluding Graham had
to be afforded some opportunity for release but stating nothing about what his
life must entail after release or when such opportunity may be granted, thereby
indicating that the juvenile merely needs to be given an actual chance for release).
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courts have resolved this issue by examining what the Graham
Court was trying to achieve in its decision.68
This contention has also led to further debate on whether life
expectancy should be involved in sentencing a juvenile offender—
discussed in more detail below.69 Some courts have used the
National Vital Statistics Reports (NVSR) to determine life
expectancies.70 Although neither side has prevailed on what a
meaningful opportunity means, both will be useful in assessing
whether geriatric release could survive Graham.71
IV. Other Forms of Release–Lengthy Term of Years Sentences
It is imperative to understand the issue of lengthy
term-of-years sentences (lengthy sentences).72 Many of the issues
discussed in lengthy term-of-years cases also appear in geriatric
release cases and many more courts have dealt with the former.73
A lengthy sentence is precisely what it sounds like: a long
sentence that can involve aggregate or concurrent sentencing.74
68. See Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1047–48 (stating the Supreme Court wanted
the juvenile to a have meaningful opportunity to reenter society or life outside of
prison); see also People v. Perez, 214 Cal. App. 4th 49, 57–58 (2013) (delineating
that there needs to be some “meaningful life expectancy” left after the opportunity
for release).
69. See State v. Zuber, 126 A.3d 335, 344–45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015)
(discussing the relevance of life expectancy when sentencing a juvenile).
70. See id. (explaining how detailed the NVSR is in determining life
expectancies).
71. See id. at 346–47 (arguing the only opportunity required is the
opportunity to obtain release); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718,
737 (2016) (agreeing with Zuber’s reasoning); Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115
A.3d 1031, 1046–48 (Conn. 2015) (arguing Graham requires a meaningful
opportunity of a life outside of prison); People v. Perez, 214 Cal. App. 4th 49, 57–
58 (2013) (expressing similar reasoning to Casiano).
72. See LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12cv340, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86090,
at *44–45 (E.D. Va. July 1, 2015) (discussing that the age an offender must attain
to be considered for geriatric release is problematic when determining whether
this would constitute a meaningful opportunity for release).
73. See, e.g., id. (dealing with a defendant’s lengthy term of years sentence).
74. See, e.g., Zuber, 126 A.3d at 343 (assuming, without deciding, that
Graham could be extended “to a situation where a defendant commits a number
of offenses . . . and receives a number of term-of-year sentences that are imposed
consecutively and result in an aggregate sentence equaling or exceeding the
[defendant’s] life expectancy . . . .”).
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Some states have ruled such a sentence is unconstitutional but
others have not.75 For example, California and Iowa have ruled
against lengthy sentences because they believe the sentences are
de facto LWOP sentences.76 These two states found that shortening
a life in prison sentence to a long number of years was
unconstitutional because youth was not taken into consideration
and their punishments were essentially LWOP.77
Alternatively, states such as Florida and Louisiana are not
convinced that lengthy sentences violate Graham.78 Florida and
Louisiana’s courts reason that creating a bright line rule in this
situation is a question better suited for the legislature.79 Louisiana
defended these decisions—without guidance from the Supreme
Court or legislature—because it was not the court’s place to
overrule lengthy sentences, even when numerous convictions
added up to more than the juvenile’s life expectancy.80
Again, one contentious issue that courts are split on is whether
“meaningful” should involve life outside of prison or just
opportunity for release. This consequently triggers the debate over
whether life expectancy should be a part the equation.81 Some
75. See Scavone, supra note 6, at 3457 (detailing different outcomes from
different courts trying to resolve the issue of lengthy sentences).
76. See id. (“Both states recognize that lengthy term-of-years sentences
produce the same results as LWOP and warrant the same concerns as those seen
in Miller.”).
77. See id. at 3460 (“In this regard, the Iowa governor simply substituted one
sentence for another in order to avoid constitutional issues. No aspects of youth
or any other factors were taken into account in the governor’s decision to commute
the thirty-eight LWOP sentences.”).
78. See id. at 3463–67 (outlining cases that have been upheld in Florida with
sentences of 110 and sixty years for example).
79. See id. (“The court noted that the exact point at which a lengthy term-ofyears sentence becomes the equivalent of LWOP cannot be determined without
drawing some sort of seemingly arbitrary line based on discretionary judgment
calls.”).
80. See id. (focusing on Graham’s limited holding, the court decided in State
v. Brown, 118 So. 3d 332 (La. 2013) that a forty-year sentence without any
possibility of parole was constitutional).
81. See State v. Zuber, 126 A.3d 335, 347–48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015)
(discussing life expectancy); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 737
(2016) (saying that if a juvenile’s crime does not reflect irrevocable corruption,
their “hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored”); Casiano
v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1047 (Conn. 2015) (arguing what meaningful
opportunity actually means).
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argue that any sentence exceeding a juvenile’s life expectancy is de
facto LWOP and therefore unconstitutional.82 Yet others argue
Graham only restricts LWOP sentences, not sentences that are
merely lengthy.83 They argue that life expectancy is not an issue in
such circumstances.84 The main concern is that the facts in
Graham did not involve multiple felonies that could call for
consecutive sentences that aggregate to lengthy sentences.85 So, a
case dealing with aggregate sentences—that could add up to a
term that exceeds the juvenile’s life expectancy—is distinguishable
from Graham.86 This issue is also split in court decisions around
the country.87
The above dispute is further complicated because even if a
lengthy sentence is unconstitutional it is not certain when the
opportunity for release must be, regarding the juvenile’s life
expectancy.88 One year? Ten years? Unfortunately, these questions
have gone unanswered.89
82. See Lowry, supra note 58, at 898 (noting the Supreme Court of California
concluded that a sentence exceeding a juvenile’s life expectancy was
unconstitutional because it did not give any opportunity for release even though
it was not technically a life sentence).
83. See id. at 902 (referencing an Arizona opinion which upheld a 139-year
sentence because none of his individual sentences would have resulted in a lifewithout-parole-sentence).
84. See id. (discussing an Arizona court that upheld a long sentence that
exceeded the juvenile’s life expectancy because Graham did not prohibit long
sentences and the juvenile at hand was being sentenced for consecutive years due
to his thirty-seven felony convictions).
85. Zuber, 126 A.3d at 343 (assuming, without deciding, that Graham could
be extended “to a situation where a defendant commits a number of
offenses . . . and receives a number of term-of-year sentences that are imposed
consecutively and result in an aggregate sentence equaling or exceeding the
[defendant’s] life expectancy . . . ”).
86. See id. (describing the circuit split over whether Graham applies to
aggregate sentences).
87. See id. (citing cases that do and do not agree with aggregate lengthy
sentences being an issue under Graham).
88. See cases cited supra note 81 (citing cases that argue whether there
needs to be essentially no time at all before his life expectancy after the juvenile
is afforded an opportunity to be released versus the juvenile being required to
have an opportunity for release with significant time left before his life
expectancy).
89. See id. (citing cases that argue over whether there needs to be essentially
no time at all before his life expectancy after the juvenile is afforded an
opportunity to be released versus the juvenile being required to have an
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Nevertheless, Graham, Roper, and Miller all attempt to make
sure that the youthful factors of a juvenile are considered when
sentencing.90 Therefore, sentencing a juvenile near his or her life
expectancy negates the juvenile’s youthful factors because a
significant portion of his or her life will be spent in prison with no
real hope for release.91
This is not to say that a prison can only assess a juvenile before
his life expectancy.92 Rather, the opportunity for release is
meaningful only if the offender is given the chance to demonstrate
rehabilitation earlier in his sentence.93 If the prison decides the
juvenile is not ready to reenter society, then the prison may deny
his release.94 This is imperative to keep in mind because many
aspects of geriatric parole depend upon age, health, and triggering
events to obtain release.95 This can be compared to the above
analysis to determine whether geriatric parole affords a
meaningful opportunity for release.96
V. Geriatric Release and Parole
This section will define and explain how most geriatric release
and parole statutes work. It will then compare the two programs
and highlight key differences. This will help further the analysis
opportunity for release with significant time left before his life expectancy).
90. See cases cited supra note 1 (citing cases that wanted youth to be
assessed because juveniles are different than adults and as they mature they may
no longer be threats to society).
91. See Mark T. Freeman, Note, Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v.
Florida and the Reality of De Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 961,
978 (2014) (explaining that lengthy sentences do not afford the juvenile any
chance at rehabilitation).
92. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010) (explaining a state has the
power to determine whether and when a perpetrator is ready to be released).
93. See id. at 73 (“It is for legislatures to determine what rehabilitative
techniques are appropriate and effective.”).
94. See id. at 75 (explaining a state has the power to determine whether and
when a perpetrator is ready to be released).
95. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2017).
96. See FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, NEW COMPASSIONATE
RELEASE RULES: BREAKING IT DOWN 1 (2013), http://famm.org/wp-content/up
loads/2013/07/FAMM-explains-new-compassionate-release-rules-FINAL.pdf
(discussing basic requirements to be considered for geriatric release) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).

623

WHAT IS LIFE?

of whether geriatric parole should be considered a meaningful
opportunity for release. It will become clear that the main
differences to focus on are the age minimums and health
requirements included in geriatric release programs that do not
exist in parole programs.97
A. Geriatric Release Defined
Examples of geriatric release statutes may be the clearest way
to define the term. One example is the federal statute for geriatric
parole, which is codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.98
Part (a) of 28 C.F.R. § 2.78 has limiting factors that are required
before an inmate is eligible for geriatric release.99 One such factor
is that the prisoner must be at least sixty-five years old with health
issues related to aging.100 Another important part to this section is
that a commission determines the eligibility for release.101 Third,
such release does not require the inmate to complete his or her
minimum sentence.102
Part (b) includes further limiting factors for geriatric
release.103 The Commission may approve geriatric parole if it finds
there is low risk that the prisoner will commit a new crime, and
the “prisoner’s release would not be incompatible with the welfare
of society.”104 Furthermore, part (c) states that, when determining
whether release should be granted, the Commission must consider

97. Compare Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-40.01 (2001), with Va. Code Ann. § 53.1151 (1993).
98. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.78 (2003) (defining geriatric parole on the federal level).
99. See id. (“Upon receipt of a report from the institution in which the
prisoner is confined that a prisoner who is at least 65 years of age has a chronic
infirmity, illness, or disease related to aging, the Commission shall determine
whether or not to release the prisoner on geriatric parole.”).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. § 2.78(a) (“Release on geriatric parole may be ordered by the
Commission at any time, whether or not the prisoner has completed his or her
minimum sentence.”).
103. See id. § 2.78(b) (laying out additional factors for granting geriatric
parole).
104. Id.
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the offender’s age at the time the crime was committed as well as
the seriousness of the crime.105
The remaining subsections of the regulation address specific
details related to the Commission’s determination of geriatric
release.106 Part (d) allows a prisoner’s representative to apply for
geriatric parole,107 while part (e) lists additional factors that the
Commission must consider when determining geriatric parole
eligibility.108 These factors, among others, include criminal history
and the severity of his or her illness.109 Part (f) allows the prisoner
to appeal the Commission’s decision.110 Finally, part (g) states that
prisoners are not eligible for geriatric parole if they were convicted
of first degree murder, were armed during the crime’s commission,
or had the physical or medical condition(s) present at the time of
their sentencing hearing.111
Virginia’s courts have recently dealt with the issue of whether
geriatric parole is a meaningful opportunity for release.112 The
Virginia statute for geriatric parole states:
Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a conviction for a felony
offense, other than a Class 1 felony, (i) who has reached the age of
sixty-five or older and who has served at least five years of the sentence
imposed or (ii) who has reached the age of sixty or older and who has
served at least ten years of the sentence imposed may petition the
Parole Board for conditional release. The Parole Board shall

105. Id.
106. Id. §2.78(d)–(g).
107. Id. § 2.78(d).
108. Id. § 2.78(e).
109. See id. (identifying seven distinct factors—including the history and
severity of the prisoner’s illness—for determining whether to grant geriatric
parole).
110. See id. § 2.78(f) (“A prisoner, the prisoner’s representative, or the
institution, may request the Commission to reconsider its decision on the basis of
changed circumstances.”).
111. Id. § 2.78(g)(2).
112. See LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12cv340, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86090,
at *38–40 (E.D. Va. July 1, 2015) (discussing the issue of whether geriatric parole
could substitute for standard parole as a meaningful opportunity for release); see
also Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 402 (Va. 2011) (agreeing with the
Commonwealth that Virginia’s geriatric release statute provides juvenile
offenders who had not committed homicide with a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release).

WHAT IS LIFE?

625

promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this
section.113

Although this state statute reads much simpler than its C.F.R.
counterpart, it differs in several important respects.
First, the Virginia code excludes Class One felons from
geriatric release eligibility.114 But Class One felonies may only
attach to perpetrators over eighteen years of age and, therefore, do
not apply to this discussion.115 Second, the Virginia code
distinguishes between ages sixty-five and sixty, and further
requires prisoners to serve a specified amount of their sentence
before becoming eligible for release.116 Third, the Virginia statue
does not require the Commission to consider certain factors related
to the prisoner.117
Conversely, the federal code does not consider geriatric release
for anyone under the age of sixty-five, and does not further impose
any time-served requirement for eligible ages.118 And yet, despite
these differences, several key similarities exist between the state
code and the relevant C.F.R. provisions. General age requirements
largely determine eligibility in both frameworks.119 Secondly, in
either framework, satisfying the age requirement alone does not
guarantee eligibility.120

113. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001) (emphasis added).
114. See id. § 53.1-40.01 (“Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a
conviction for a felony offense, other than a Class 1 felony . . . may petition the
Parole Board for conditional release.”).
115. See id. § 18.2-10 (defining class one felonies).
116. See id. § 53.1-40.01 (stating that prisoners age sixty-five or older must
serve five years of their sentence as compared prisoners aged sixty or older, who
must serve ten years of their sentence).
117. Id.
118. 28 C.F.R.§ 2.78 (2003).
119. Compare id. § 2.78 (mandating the individual to be at least sixty-five
years old and have a chronic illness), with VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001)
(requiring candidates to be at least sixty-five years old and have served five years
or be sixty-years old and served ten years of sentence).
120. Compare id. § 2.78 (“[T]he Commission shall determine whether or not
to release the prisoner on geriatric parole. Release on geriatric parole may be
ordered by the Commission at any time, whether or not the prisoner has
completed his or her minimum sentence.”), with VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01
(2001) (stating that a Commission will determine eligibility separate from
whether the prisoner satisfies the age requirement).
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The Bureau of Prisons also created guidelines that detail three
categories of prisoners that may be eligible for geriatric release.121
The first category identifies eligibility on the basis of medical
reasons, such as terminal or debilitating illnesses.122 The second
category establishes eligibility on the basis of age.123 This category
further distinguishes seniors with medical conditions from those
without.124 The latter requires that prisoners, who are at least
seventy years old, serve thirty years of his or her sentence.125
Further, eligible prisoners without medical conditions also
include those sixty-five years or older who serve ten years or
75 percent of their sentence.126 Alternatively, eligible prisoners
with medical conditions include those sixty-five or older who serve
50 percent or more of their sentence and suffer from chronic or
serious condition.127 Such conditions may be due to age,
deteriorating mental or physical health substantially diminishing
the ability to function in prison, or generally those conditions
which treatment will not improve.128 The final group of categories
includes non-medical necessity—like taking care of a child or
spouse.129 Again, although some differences exist between these
rules and the preceding statutes, age and health remain key
factors for determining a person’s eligibility for geriatric release.130
121. See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra note 96, at 1
(describing new rules for compassionate release and reduction in sentencing
programs).
122. See id. at 1–2 (including within the first category of eligibility prisoners
that have a “terminal medical condition” or a “debilitated medical condition”).
123. See id. at 2 (listing the second category of eligibility as “elderly”).
124. See id. (dividing the second category of eligibility between “elderly nonmedical” and “elderly medical”).
125. See id. (describing the eligibility requirements for elderly prisoners
without medical conditions).
126. Id.
127. See id. (setting eligibility requirements for elderly prisoners with medical
conditions).
128. See id. (explaining qualifying medical conditions).
129. See id. at 2–4 (describing eligibility categories on the basis of non-medical
necessity).
130. Compare FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, supra note 96, at 2
(considering only candidates who satisfy the elderly medical or elderly no-medical
requirements), with VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001) (requiring the candidate
to be over sixty-five and served five years or over sixty and served ten years to be
considered), and 28 C.F.R. § 2.78 (2003) (basing geriatric parole on the
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As of May 2015, only a few states— Illinois, Massachusetts,
South Carolina, and Utah—do not have laws regarding geriatric
release in their prisons.131 Comparatively, forty-six states, the
federal government, and Washington D.C. all have
geriatric-release laws.132 Many of these states differ on the
appropriate procedures and regulations for geriatric parole:
Only 18 of the states seem to have very specific, strictly
defined . . . regulations to follow for parole decisions. The more
specific rules include the mechanism, such as who makes the
final determination. In addition, 11 states have very clearly
written rules governing physician documentation . . . and what
factors must be included in their medical letter.
Though all applications are subject to official parole board
review, the series of steps in order to reach the parole board and
the supporting documentation varies. [M]ost provide for a
deputy warden in conjunction with the prison medical director
reviewing all documentation prior [to] making a submission to
the parole board. Often, the prisoner or his advocate . . . will
petition directly [to the board]. The medical director can also
petition for early release if the prisoner cannot. The 29 states
that have fewer procedures . . . that provide that parole review
boards consider all information prior to rendering a final
decision. At least 3 states have requirements that the parole
board must review the request for early parole within a certain
number of days (e.g., 30 days), while most assume the case will
be heard in a timely manner or be reviewed by the next meeting
of the parole board.133

Importantly, with slight variations, each state’s law centers
around age and health.134

individuals age and whether they are ill).
131. See Tina Maschi et al., Analysis of United States Compassionate and
Geriatric Release Laws: Towards a Rights-Based Response for Diverse Elders and
Their Families and Communities, BE THE EVIDENCE INT’L 9 (2015),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/Analysis%20of%20United%
20States%20Compassionate%20and%20Geriatric%20Release%20Laws,%20Be%
20the%20Evidence%20Press,%202015.pdf (analyzing the laws and regulations
related to early releases of prisoners on the basis of advanced age or illness) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
132. See id. (identifying all the jurisdictions that have geriatric release laws).
133. Id. at 14.
134. Id. at 3.
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Geriatric release programs have many benefits.135 Lowered
costs and freed-up budgets represent one major justification for
releasing people.136 For example, “[i]t costs around $24,000 a year
to house a young prisoner, but the expenses for an aging prisoner
can be up to $72,000 per year.”137 This difference largely results
from differing medical costs.138 Furthermore, “[i]nmates are not
eligible for federal health insurance programs such as Medicaid
and Medicare, but by law are required to receive medical
treatment . . . prisons cover all the costs . . . [regardless of] whose
responsibility it is to maintain prisons, taxpayers are the ones who
pay for it.”139 Thus, considering these costs and the low threat that
older prisoners with health problems pose to society, many feel the
eligibility for early release is justified.140
B. Parole Defined
Parole is essentially a prisoner’s release from prison prior to
serving his or her entire sentence.141 Having met certain
conditions, paroled prisoners serve the remainder of their sentence
outside of prison “under strict supervision.”142 Although these
conditions may differ for every person, parole commonly includes:
135. See Valeriya Metla, Aging Inmates: A Prison Crisis, L. STREET (Feb. 15,
2015), https://law streetmedia.com/issues/law-and-politics/aging-inmates-prisoncrisis/ (detailing the expenses of housing criminals) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Maschi et al., supra note
131, at 6 (stating the cost on a nationwide level that elderly prisoners cost nearly
$2.1 billion annually as of 2012, about three times the cost of younger prisoners).
136. See id. (identifying one rational for early release of prisoners).
137. Id.
138. See id. (correlating increased expenses for aging prisoner populations
with increased prevalence of health issues).
139. Id.
140. See id. (identifying another rational for early release of prisoners).
141. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE [hereinafter DOJ
FAQ], https://www. justice.gov/uspc/frequently-asked-questions#q2 (last updated
Sept. 29, 2015) (“When someone is paroled, they serve part of their sentence under
the supervision of their community.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
142. FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LACK OF PAROLE FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1 (Nov. 29, 2012),
[hereinafter LACK OF PAROLE FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS] http://famm.org/
Repository/Files/FAQ%20Federal%20Parole%2011%2029%2012.pdf (describing
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An agreement not to leave the state/district; [f]requent
meetings with a parole officer; [a]n agreement not to be out past
a certain hour (also called curfew); [a]n agreement not to use or
possess drugs, alcohol, firearms, etc.; [k]eeping a steady job;
[a]ttending drug or alcohol addiction treatment programs;
[s]ubmitting to frequent or random drug tests; [and] [n]ot
associating with people with criminal records.143

Comparatively, the United States Department of Justice describes
parole as placing someone “under the supervision of their
community . . . if (a) the inmate has substantially observed the
rules of the institution; (b) release would not depreciate the
seriousness of the offense or promote disrespect for the law; and
(c) release would not jeopardize the public welfare.”144
Nevertheless, not all systems allow for parole.145 Typically,
those systems that do not have parole use a similar system called
“good time credits,” which likewise allows for early release based
on good behavior.146 To elaborate, the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (SRA) eliminated federal parole for all prisoners convicted on
or after November 1, 1987.147 Nevertheless, the SRA did not
eliminate parole eligibility for prisoners sentenced before that
date.148 The United States Parole Commission therefore retains
some authority to grant early release.149
The Commission performs parole hearings for a small number
of people who fall into one of the following categories: those
convicted before November 1, 1987; military code offenders in
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institutions; violators of D.C. law
sentenced before August 5, 2000; criminals prosecuted in other
the process of parole) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
143. Id.
144. DOJ FAQ, supra note 141.
145. See LACK OF PAROLE FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS, supra note 142, at 1 (“The
alternative is a system in which the sentence cannot be reduced by parole. A
sentence must be served in its entirety (though often with reductions for good
behavior, set by statute).”).
146. See id. (describing what happens in “truth in sentencing” systems).
147. See id. at 2 (stating that although a statutory federal parole system
technically does not exist, a parole board may nonetheless issue parole for
prisoners sentenced before November 1, 1987).
148. Id.
149. See id. (detailing the authority and responsibilities of the United States
Parole Commission).
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countries, but transferred to the U.S for punishment; and State
defendants in the U.S. Marshals Service Witness Protection
Program.150
Congress abolished the federal parole system partly because
of its goal to punish criminal offenders as opposed to rehabilitating
them.151 Furthermore, Congress, like many others, believed that
prison could not effectively rehabilitate people.152 Congress also
decided to abolish parole because it caused uncertain and
inconsistent prison terms.153 For example, while two criminals look
identical on paper—having committed the same crime, and
possessing the same criminal record and corresponding sentence—
one may serve far less time than the other due to inconsistent
guidelines and rules for parole boards.154 Finally, Congress was
concerned about public fear of releasing a criminal too early who
would then commit another crime.155
Many states’ systems for parole eligibility differ.156
Nonetheless, most states’ parole board will review the prisoner’s
record and interview him.157 Some common questions parole
boards ask when deciding parole eligibility include: whether they
have a stable home to return to, whether the prisoner can
immediately support himself with income, the likelihood of
recidivism, the seriousness of the offense, whether the prisoner
followed prison rules while incarcerated, and if the victims have
any strong concerns regarding the prisoner’s parole.158
150. See id. (listing categories of people eligible for parole on the federal level).
151. See id. (identifying Congress’ goals for the criminal justice system).
152. See id. (“The SRA rejected rehabilitation as the primary goal of our
sentencing system. Instead, it stated that the purpose of imprisonment is
punishment.”).
153. See id. (“The public and Congress frowned upon these kinds of
inconsistencies and uncertainties.”).
154. See id. (identifying differences resulting from varying parole board
guidelines).
155. See id. at 3 (“In the late 1970s, when lawmakers wanted to eliminate
federal parole, many polls showed that the public favored longer sentences for
prisoners. The public also believed that parole was “setting people free” who were
still a danger to society.”).
156. See id. at 4 (“Every state’s process for deciding when a person will be
considered for parole is different.”).
157. See id. (“Typically, the board interviews the prisoner or reviews his
record.”).
158. Id.; see Janet Portman, The Parole Process: An Early Release from Prison,
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Additionally, some states issue tests to those who are applying for
parole, such as psychological exams.159 Notably, most states give
full power to the parole board to decide if the prisoner is ready for
release; their decision typically cannot be appealed or challenged
in any court.160
Virginia’s parole system is a good example of what such a
system with a fully empowered parole board looks like. Virginia’s
parole system categorizes parole eligibility according to how many
prior offenses the prisoner has.161 For example, first-time offenders
may be eligible for parole after serving one-fourth of the sentence,
or after serving twelve years of the sentence, if one-fourth of the
sentence is more than twelve years.162 Second-time offenders are
eligible for parole after serving one-third of the sentence, or after
serving thirteen years of the sentence if one-third of the sentence
is more than thirteen years.163 The time increments then increase
to one-half and fourteen years for third time offenders and then
three-fourths and fifteen years for fourth time offenders.164 The
http://criminal.lawyers.com/parole-probation/parole-an-early-release-fro
mprison.html (last visited April 17, 2018) (explaining additional common concerns
about a parole board’s review) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
159. LACK OF PAROLE FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS, supra note 142, at 4
(“Sometimes, prisoners are given psychological exams or other tests by the
board.”).
160. Id.
161. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(A) (1993).
162. See id. § 53.1-151(A)(1) (“For the first time, shall be eligible for parole
after serving one-fourth of the term of imprisonment imposed, or after serving
twelve years of the term of imprisonment imposed if one-fourth of the term of
imprisonment imposed is more than twelve years . . . .”).
163. See id. § 53.1-151(A)(2) (“For the second time, shall be eligible for parole
after serving one-third of the term of imprisonment imposed, or after serving
thirteen years of the term of imprisonment imposed if one-third of the term of
imprisonment imposed is more than thirteen years . . . .”).
164. See id. § 53.1-151(A)(3) (“For the third time, shall be eligible for parole
after serving one-half of the term of imprisonment imposed, or after serving
fourteen years of the term of imprisonment imposed if one-half of the term of
imprisonment imposed is more than fourteen years . . . .”); see also id.
§ 53.1-151(A)(4) (“For the fourth or subsequent time, shall be eligible for parole
after serving three-fourths of the term of imprisonment imposed, or after serving
fifteen years of the term of imprisonment imposed if three-fourths of the term of
imprisonment imposed is more than fifteen years.”); Krawetz v. Murray, 742 F.
Supp. 304, 306–07 (E.D. Va. 1990) (explaining how the Virginia statute is applied
to a fourth-time offender).
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Virginia statute also limits eligibility for parole by preventing
certain offenders from applying.165
The United States Department of Justice has also stipulated
pertinent justifications for parole:
Parole has a three-fold purpose: (1) . . . a parolee may obtain
help with problems concerning employment, residence,
finances, or other personal problems which often trouble a
person trying to adjust to life upon release from prison;
(2) parole protects society because it helps former prisoners get
established in the community and thus prevents many
situations in which they might commit a new offense; and
(3) parole prevents needless imprisonment of those who are not
likely to commit further crime and who meet the criteria for
parole.166

In sum, parole is designed to release those who are ready to return
to society and be productive as well as to cut costs for taxpayers
who are spending money to incarcerate criminals.
C. Comparing Geriatric Release and Parole
One major difference between geriatric release and parole is
the age requirement.167 Eligibility for geriatric release depends on
165. See id. § 53.1-151(B) (”Persons sentenced to die shall not be eligible for
parole. Any person sentenced to life imprisonment who escapes from a
correctional facility or from any person in charge of his custody shall not be
eligible for parole.”); see id. § 53.1-151(B1) (“Any person convicted of three
separate felony offenses of (i) murder, (ii) rape or (iii) robbery by the presenting
of firearms or other deadly weapon . . . shall not be eligible for parole.”); see also
id. § 53.1-151(B2) (“Any person convicted of three separate felony offenses of
manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing or possessing with the intent to
manufacture, sell, give or distribute a controlled substance . . . shall not be
eligible for parole.”): id. § 53.1-151(E) (“A person convicted of an offense and
sentenced to life imprisonment after being paroled from a previous life sentence
shall not be eligible for parole.”).
166. DOJ FAQ, supra note 141.
167. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001) (listing geriatric release
candidates as prisoners who are age sixty-five or older, having served five years
of their sentence, or sixty or older, having served ten years of their sentence); see
also 28 C.F.R. § 2.78 (2003) (listing sixty-five as the minimum age for federal
geriatric release candidates). But see Maschi et al., supra note 131, at 12–13
(explaining that age is not a sole, determinative factor for parole); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.1-151 (1993) (providing an example of a state parole system that does not
consider age before eligibility for parole).
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a minimum age requirement.168 Conversely, parole does not have
an age requirement.169 This is a considerable difference especially
for juveniles. For example, if a sixteen-year-old juvenile is
sentenced to life in prison in Virginia, he may be eligible for parole
after completing fifteen years of his sentence at age thirty-one.170
On the other hand, in a system where the same juvenile does not
have the opportunity for parole but for geriatric release, he
would—by a liberal standard—be eligible for release at age sixty,
thereby forcing him to serve at least forty-four years of his life
sentence.171
Furthermore, not only must the prisoner be elderly to qualify
for geriatric release, but in most cases the prisoner must also be in
bad health.172 In contrast, poor health is not a requirement for
parole.173 A parole board’s real task is to decide whether the
prisoner is ready to re-enter society as a productive human
being.174 As indicated above, parole boards consider other criteria
for release that commissions overseeing geriatric release do not
consider. For example, parole boards consider where the prisoner
168. See id. § 53.1-40.01 (listing geriatric release candidates as prisoners who
are age sixty-five or older, having served five years of their sentence, or sixty or
older, having served ten years of their sentence); 28 C.F.R. § 2.78 (2003) (listing
sixty-five as the minimum age for federal geriatric release candidates).
169. See Maschi et al., supra note 131, at 12–13 (explaining that age is not a
sole, determinative factor for parole); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151 (providing
an example of a state parole system that does not consider age for eligibility for
parole).
170. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(C) (“Any person sentenced to life
imprisonment for the first time shall be eligible for parole after serving fifteen
years . . . .”).
171. See, e.g., id. § 53.1-40.01 (listing geriatric release candidates as prisoners
who are age sixty-five or older, having served five years of their sentence, or sixty
or older, having served ten years of their sentence).
172. See Maschi et al., supra note 131, at 13 (“The age of the applicant is
almost always considered a determinant factor only in conjunction with a medical
or cognitive condition. The elderly incarcerated are not considered a subset of
incarcerated people that justify release in their own right without concomitant
ailments.”).
173. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151 (1993) (providing an example of a
state parole system that does not consider health for eligibility for parole).
174. See Maschi et al., supra note 131, at 12 (“Many of the states that include
vague language around what constellation of factors amount to the likelihood of
early release seem to have fewer transparent processes, leaving the decision to
the parole board’s discretion on a case-by-case basis.”).
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will stay, whether the prisoner has a source of income, and
whether the prisoner is refraining from drug or alcohol use.175
Virginia’s statistics on parole and geriatric release are useful
for comparing the systems. 176 In 2016, the Virginia Parole Board
considered 2,451 prisoners for parole.177 Of these cases, 125
prisoners were granted parole and 2,326 were denied.178 So about
five percent of eligible prisoners were granted parole.179 In 2016,
the Virginia Parole Board reviewed 626 prisoners’ cases for
geriatric release.180 Of those 626 prisoners, twenty-six were
granted release.181 Which is a little more than four percent.182
While the number of cases differ, the probability of release was
nearly the same in both systems in 2016.183
In 2015, Virginia paroled fourteen percent of applicants for
parole and granted only two percent for geriatric release.184
Nevertheless, 2015 was more of the exception than the rule. For
example, in 2014 about 6.6 percent of prisoners were granted
parole and about four percent were released for geriatric
reasons.185 In 2013, 3.7 percent were granted parole and 3.3
percent were released for geriatric reasons.186 In total, for the past
four years, the percentage of people that applied for parole and
were granted release was about 7.7 percent.187 The total number
175. See, e.g., DOJ FAQ, supra note 141 (explaining that many subjects are
considered, including “the details of the offense, prior criminal history, . . . the
offender’s accomplishments in the correctional facility, details of a release plan,
and any problems the offender has had to meet in the past and is likely to face
again in the future.”); see also, e.g., LACK OF PAROLE FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS,
supra note 142, at 4 (providing a list of questions that a state parole board might
ask a parole candidate).
176. See generally Parole Decisions, VA. PAROLE BOARD, https://vpb.virginia.
gov/parole-decisions/ (last visited April 17, 2018) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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for geriatric release over the same amount of time was about 3.6
percent of those whose cases were reviewed.188 Remember, the
main reason for the large disparity is the 2015 outlier: parole of
fourteen percent.189
The age and health requirements are the likely reasons for
such a drastic difference in case numbers because fewer prisoners
are over the age sixty-five than there are under age sixty-five.190 In
fact, it is estimated that only 4,780 prisoners are over age sixtyfive, out of the total 182,834 prisoners as February 2018.191 This
means only about 2.6 percent of the prison population is over age
sixty-five and even fewer than that would likely meet the health
requirements.192 Even lowering the age requirement to sixty would
only increase the percentage of the population to about 5.5
percent.193
In brief, eligibility for parole and geriatric release differ.194 The
Supreme Court of Virginia stated: “[t]he determination of a
prisoner’s eligibility for geriatric release is essentially a
mathematical calculation. The age of the prisoner and the years
served of the sentence imposed are readily determinable and, thus,
not subject to speculation.”195 Thus, geriatric release seemingly
serves to save money for taxpayers.196 Conversely, age and health
equations are not determinative for parole197 because parole was
designed to rehabilitate the offender and make them a productive
law abiding citizen again.198 Finally, in Virginia, the probability of
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See generally FED. BUREAU PRISONS, Inmate Age, https://www.bop.
gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_age.jsp (last updated Mar. 24, 2018) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001) (stipulating geriatric release
regulations), with id. § 53.1-151(A)(1) (stipulating parole eligibility regulations).
195. Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (Va. 2000).
196. See DOJ FAQ, supra note 141 (noting that parole, in part, serves to end
the “needless imprisonment of those who are not likely to commit further crime”).
197. See Maschi et al., supra note 131, at 12–13 (indicating that many states
only use age as a factor in decision-making for geriatric release).
198. See DOJ FAQ, supra note 141 (explaining that supervision within the
parole system is geared toward “reintegrating the offender as a productive
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release under either geriatric release or parole is about the same,
but many more prisoners are considered for parole.199
VI. How Courts Have Handled Geriatric Release as a Meaningful
Opportunity for Release Thus Far
This section addresses how courts have handled geriatric
release as a meaningful opportunity for release. In State v.
Zuber,200 Ricky Zuber committed two separate gang rapes when he
was seventeen years old.201 His consecutive sentences totaled 110
years with fifty-five years of parole ineligibility.202 The court was
mainly concerned about the lengthy term-of-years sentence.203
Zuber argued this was unconstitutional under Graham but the
Superior Court upheld the sentence.204 The court stated that it
thought geriatric release could meet the standard for meaningful
opportunity for release under Graham.205
In State v. Null,206 Denem Anthony Null was “required to serve
at least 52.5 years of his seventy-five-year aggregate sentence for
member of society”).
199. See generally VA. PAROLE BOARD, supra note 176.
200. See State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197 (N.J. 2017) (quoting Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012)) (holding “that sentencing judges should evaluate the
Miller factors at that time to ‘take into account how children are different, and
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime
in prison.’”).
201. See id. at 337 (“Defendant Ricky Zuber was born on April 14, 1964. He
committed two separate gang rapes in November and December of 1981, when he
was nearly eighteen years old.”).
202. See id. (“He is currently serving consecutive sentences for numerous
offenses arising out of these two criminal episodes. Those sentences total 110
years in prison with fifty-five years of parole ineligibility.”).
203. See id. (“To apply Graham to defendant’s sentences, Graham would have
to be extended to cover terms-of-year sentences, aggregated from consecutive
sentences for different crimes, from different criminal episodes, imposed in
different sentencing proceedings.”).
204. See id. (“Even making the assumptions that Graham could be thus
extended, we reject the defendant’s claim.”).
205. See id. (“Defendant’s sentence of fifty-five years before parole eligibility
is not the functional equivalent of life without parole, because it gives him a
meaningful and realistic opportunity for parole well within the predicted lifespan
for a person of defendant’s age.”).
206. See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72 (Iowa 2013) (holding Miller’s
principles are applicable “to a lengthy term-of-years sentence as was imposed in

WHAT IS LIFE?

637

second-degree murder and first-degree robbery.”207 Null was
sixteen-years-old when he shot and killed Kevin Bell during a
robbery at Bell’s apartment.208 The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed
Null’s conviction, but vacated his sentence and remanded the case
for resentencing.209 The court decided this lengthy sentence
required Miller type protections.210 It reasoned that geriatric
release does not escape the rationales of Graham because it
requires the juvenile to have served nearly half a century in prison
before they would be in their sixties.211 Furthermore, the court
stated there is no certainty the juvenile would ever be considered
for geriatric release and therefore is not a meaningful opportunity
for release.212
In the next case, Bear Cloud v. State,213 a sixteen-year-old
Wyatt Bear Cloud was convicted of first-degree murder,
aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated
burglary.214 Mr. Bear Cloud “stole a gun” and “later broke into a
this case because an offender sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years sentence
should not be worse off than an offender sentenced to life in prison without parole
who has the benefit of an individualized hearing under Miller.”).
207. Id. at 45.
208. Id.
209. See id. (“[W]e affirm Null’s conviction, but vacate his sentence and
remand the case to the district court for resentencing consistent with this
opinion.”).
210. See id. at 71 (concluding that a “52.5-year minimum prison term for a
juvenile based on the aggregation of mandatory minimum sentences for seconddegree murder and first-degree robbery triggers the protections to be afforded
under Miller—namely, an individualized sentencing hearing to determine the
issue of parole eligibility”).
211. See id. (“Even if lesser sentence than life without parole might be less
problematic, we do not regard the juvenile’s potential future release in his or her
late sixties after a half a century of incarceration sufficient to escape the
rationales of Graham or Miller.”).
212. See id. (“The prospect of geriatric release, if one is to be afforded the
opportunity for release at all, does not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to
demonstrate the ‘maturity and rehabilitation’ required to obtain release and
reenter a society as required by Graham.”).
213. See Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 141–42 (Wyo. 2014) (holding “that
the teachings of the Roper/Graham/Miller trilogy require sentencing courts to
provide an individualized sentencing hearing to weigh the factors for determining
a juvenile’s ‘diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform’ when, as
here, the aggregate sentences result in the functional equivalent of life without
parole.”).
214. See id. at 135 (listing the criminal convictions of the defendant, Bear
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home along with two other young men.”215 During the burglary,
one of the two other men, Mr. Sen, “shot and killed one of the
home’s residents with the stolen gun.”216 Mr. Bear Cloud was
sentenced to “20–25 years in prison for Aggravated Burglary; life
in prison ‘according to law’ for first-degree murder, to be served
consecutively to the aggravated burglary sentence; and 20–25
years in prison for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, to
be served concurrently with the first-degree murder sentence.”217
The main issue of his appeal was whether the sentence of life in
prison without parole, based on the aggregate term of years,
violates the Eight Amendment.218 The Wyoming Supreme Court
agreed with the Iowa Supreme Court’s reasoning in Null, which
found that geriatric release was not a meaningful opportunity for
release under Graham.219 Thus, the Wyoming Supreme Court
remanded the case for resentencing in accordance with Graham
and Miller.220
The final set of cases comes from Virginia, where the most
recent decisions have been made. One of the first cases that
addressed this issue in the Commonwealth was Angel v.
Commonwealth,221 in which Rubio Argelio Angel—a seventeenyear-old—was arrested for malicious wounding, abduction with
intent to defile, two counts of object sexual penetration, and
misdemeanor sexual battery.222 Angel “was sentenced to three

Cloud).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 135 (quoting Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36, 40 (Wyo. 2013))
(“On remand, even though the United States Supreme Court had vacated the
judgment without restriction, this Court held that ‘[o]nly the life sentence for
first-degree murder is at issue in this appeal.’”).
219. See id. at 142 (“We find the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court [in
Null] to be persuasive.”).
220. See id. at 147 (“We reverse and remand to the district court for
resentencing in accordance with this opinion.”).
221. Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 402 (Va. 2011) (holding that
“that the imposition of life sentences without parole in this case is not cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution pursuant to Graham”).
222. Id. at 389.
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consecutive life terms and a twenty-year term of imprisonment,
plus twelve months in jail.”223
One of the issues in Angel was whether this life sentence,
without an opportunity for parole, was valid under Graham.224 The
Supreme Court of Virginia reasoned that Angel’s sentence did not
violate Graham because there was an opportunity for release via
Virginia’s geriatric release program.225 The Court stated, “[w]hile
this statute has an age qualifier, it provides, as the Commonwealth
argues, the ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ required by the Eighth
Amendment.”226
In Vasquez v. Commonwealth,227 sixteen-year-old Darien
Vasquez and Brandon Valentin broke into a townhouse, raped a
college student and “threatened to kill her if she resisted.”228
Vasquez was convicted of eighteen felonies and Valentin of
twelve.229 The defendants argued that their “aggregate term-ofyears sentences imposed by the court violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.”230
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided that the Graham rule “does
not apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences involving multiple
crimes.”231 In the concurring opinion, Justice Mims, with whom
Justice Goodwyn joined, stated that Graham should have applied
to aggregate term of years sentences but that Virginia’s geriatric
223. Id.
224. See id. at 401 (explaining that Angel’s petition for appeal and brief on
the merits before [the Virginia Supreme Court] “contained an assignment of error
claiming that [his] sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution”).
225. See id. (“The Commonwealth replies that Graham does not require the
result advanced by Angel because Code § 53.1-40.01 provides for the conditional
release of prisoners who have reached a certain age and served a certain length
of imprisonment, thus complying with the Supreme Court’s decision. We agree
with the Commonwealth.”).
226. Id. at 402.
227. See Vazquez v. Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920, 928 (Va. 2016) (holding
that “Graham does not apply to aggregate term-of-years sentences
involving multiple crimes”).
228. Id. at 922.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 928.
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release statute would nevertheless make these sentences
constitutional even without the opportunity for parole.232
The next and most recent case from Virginia is LeBlanc v.
Mathena.233 In this case, LeBlanc was found “guilty of rape and
abduction.”234 He committed the offenses “when he was sixteen
years old.”235 He was sentenced to two life imprisonment terms.236
Furthermore, he was ineligible for parole pursuant to Va. Code
Ann. § 53.1-165.1.237 The issue here was whether geriatric release
could meet the meaningful opportunity that Graham requires.238
The Virginia Supreme Court said the geriatric release statute does
satisfy Graham so the decision was appealed to the United States
District Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.239
The Fourth Circuit stated, “Virginia courts unreasonably
ignored the plain language of the procedures governing review of
petitions for geriatric release, which authorize the State Parole
Board to deny geriatric release for any reason, without considering
a juvenile offender’s maturity and rehabilitation.”240 Accordingly,
the court decided that the presence of the geriatric release statute

232. See id. at 935 (Mims, J., concurring) (explaining that “Virginia’s geriatric
release statute, if applied as written, is capable of providing juveniles with such
sentences a meaningful opportunity for release as mandated by Graham . . .”).
233. See LeBlanc v. Mathena, 841 F.3d 256, 273 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that
“the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied Graham when
it acknowledged Graham’s minimum requirements for parole or early release
programs for juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment but
concluded that Geriatric Release . . . complied with those requirements”).
234. Id. at 260.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id. (“Petitioner was ineligible for parole pursuant to Va. Code Ann
§ 53.1-165.1, which abolished parole for individuals convicted of a felony
committed after January 1, 1995.”).
238. See id. (“In 2011, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his sentence in state
trial court. The motion argued that Graham rendered Petitioner’s life sentence
invalid. In opposition, Respondents asserted that, notwithstanding Virginia’s
abolition of parole, Petitioner’s life sentence did not violate Graham . . . .”).
239. See id. at 259–60 (“[W]e nonetheless conclude that Petitioner’s state
court adjudication constituted an unreasonable application of Graham. Most
significantly, Virginia courts unreasonably ignored the plain language of the
procedures governing review of petitions for geriatric release . . . .”).
240. Id.
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did not meet the Graham requirements for meaningful opportunity
and, therefore, LeBlanc’s sentence was unconstitutional.241
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that parole and geriatric release
were not enough alike for geriatric release to hold up under
Graham.242 Some of the differences the court indicated were the
age limitation for geriatric release, the prisoner must make the
claim for geriatric release—whereas parole is an automatic annual
review—geriatric release may be denied before considering any
“decision factors,” the geriatric release board does not need to
interview the prisoner, and geriatric release requires approval by
four of the five members whereas parole only requires three.243
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the
Fourth Circuit’s decision and reversed.244 The Court made it clear
that its decision was not based on whether Geriatric release is
reasonable under Graham, but rather on whether the Fourth
Circuit’s decision was objectively reasonable “in light of this
Court’s current case law.”245 Indeed, the Court recognized the
arguments for and against geriatric release as a meaningful
opportunity for release under Graham.246 The Court then
reasoned, “[t]hese arguments cannot be resolved on federal habeas
review. . . . Nor does the Court ‘suggest or imply that the
underlying issue, if presented on direct review, would be
insubstantial. The Court today holds only that the Virginia trial
court’s
ruling. . . was
not objectively
unreasonable. . . .”247
Consequently, the issue has been left unresolved.
241. See id. (internal citations omitted) (“[I]t was objectively unreasonable for
the state courts to conclude that geriatric release affords Petitioner with the
‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation’ Graham demands. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to relief from
his unconstitutional sentence.”).
242. See id. at 268 (explaining that “[f]or several reasons, we agree with
Petitioner that his state court adjudication constituted an ‘unreasonable
application’ of Graham”).
243. See id. at 262–63 (detailing differences between parole and geriatric
release).
244. See Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. 1726, 1730 (2017) (“For these
reasons . . . the judgement of the Court of Appeals is reversed.”).
245. Id. at 1729.
246. See id. (explaining that the standard that no “fairminded people” could
disagree on this issue, was not met).
247. Id.
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VII. Conclusion

In brief, the Graham rule intended to eliminate the possibility
of LWOP sentences for juveniles in non-homicide cases.248 The
intent behind this rule was largely based on the fact that juveniles
are less culpable than adults and lack maturity.249 This youthful
factor is important in sentencing because it is possible the juvenile
will mature, learn from their mistakes, and become fully
rehabilitated.250 A LWOP sentence does not consider this factor
because the juvenile may never be released from prison regardless
of their rehabilitation. This is why the Supreme Court requires a
meaningful opportunity for release in these cases.251
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court left it to the states to decide
what would constitute a “meaningful opportunity for release.”252
Many states have had issues with defining “meaningful
opportunity for release” and have come up with various ways to
effectively sentence a juvenile to LWOP without literally doing
so.253 For example, some states have contemplated geriatric
release as a “meaningful opportunity.”254 Numerous courts have
refused to accept that geriatric release satisfies Graham.255
Some reasons for this may be because geriatric release differs
from parole markedly in that it has age and health
requirements.256 So, if a juvenile’s only opportunity for release is
geriatric parole, they will not be eligible for release until they are
248. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (describing the
implications of the Graham decision for juvenile sentencing).
249. Id.at 68.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 74.
252. Id.
253. See Lowry, supra note 58, at 912–13 (giving examples of the variety of
different outcomes on how to deal with Graham).
254. Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 402 (Va. 2011); State v. Null,
836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013); Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 142 (Wyo.
2014); LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12cv340, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86090, *39
(E.D. Va. July 1, 2015).
255. See cases cited supra note 254 (citing cases which have not concluded
geriatric release as a factor meeting Graham).
256. See 28 C.F.R. 2.78 (2003) (defining geriatric parole on the federal level);
see also VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (2001) (defining geriatric release on a state
level).
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at least sixty-years-old and even then, they need to meet the other
requirements.257 Accordingly, like life without parole sentences,
geriatric release does not take the youth factor into account.
Therefore, geriatric release should not satisfy the meaningful
opportunity for release that Graham requires.

257.

Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-40.01.

